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A DIALOGIC DEFENSE OF ALDEN
Jay Tidmarsh*
I find myself in the odd position of arguing that Alden v. Maine' is
right, or at least not wrong. Do not misunderstand-I do not like the
result in Alden any more than the next guy. But to not like the result
and to argue that Alden is wrong as a matter of constitutional principle
are two different matters. I am willing to argue that Alden is consistent
with, albeit not compelled by, constitutional principle.
Implicit in the last sentence is the assumption that, had Alden
been decided in accordance with Justice Souter's rather than Justice
Kennedy's views, it would still have been consistent with constitutional
principle. This assumption may seem impossible to maintain, since
Alden appears to be a decision about the scope of Article III and the
Eleventh Amendment, and the views of Justice Souter and his three
fellow dissenters on the scope of the constitutional immunity of states
appear flatly at odds with the views of Justice Kennedy's majority. To
suggest that both views can be maintained is to say that Alden is not a
constitutional decision, but rather a prudential decision about the
best way to give effect to the fundamental structure of the Constitu-
tion. Implicit in this suggestion is the further proposition that, as a
prudential decision, Alden is subject to modification, or even reversal,
at some future point.
This last claim, though giving some faint hope to those who op-
pose Alden, would appear easily refuted by the language of Alden,
which certainly does not sound prudential in its tone.2 I agree with
this refutation, to a degree. I have no intention of defending the rea-
soning of eitherJustice Kennedy orJustice Souter. But I do intend to
defend the result, which was within the range of permissible constitu-
tional choice-as was Justice Souter's contrary proposed result.
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. I thank Tom Rowe for insightful
comments on a draft of this Essay.
1 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
2 See id. at 2246 ("We hold that the powers delegated to Congress under Article I
of the United States Constitution do not include the power to subject nonconsenting
states to private suits for damages in state courts."); id. at 2266 (discussing "[t]he
constitutional privilege of a State to assert its sovereign immunity in its own courts").
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Briefly stated, my defense is this: The question posed in Alden,
Seminole Tribe,3 and other Eleventh Amendment cases is a part of the
three fundamental structural questions that underlie the range of sub-
jects that are loosely grouped within the subject area that we call "Fed-
eral Courts": first, the proper relationship between state and federal
courts; second, the proper relationship between these courts and the
legislative and executive branches of government (at both the state
and the federal levels); and third, the proper relationship between the
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts. In recent years, the
views on these questions have tended to divide into two camps. 4 The
first is the "nationalist" camp, which sees a strong (and, with respect to
the enforcement of federal rights, primary) role for federal courts in
relation to the state courts and the state and federal legislative and
executive branches. 5 The second is the "federalist" camp, which seeks
to preserve both a stronger role for state courts in the enforcement of
federal rights and the prerogatives of the state executive and legisla-
tive branches as against federal authority.6 The problem with both
camps is that, although they can be powerful analytical and narrative
tools, they fail at the level of description; there are cases and doctrines
that seem inconsistent with the theories. 7 A theory that is inconsistent
3 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
4 For a development of this dichotomy, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of
Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REv. 1141 (1988).
5 This camp is also consistent with, and often a part of, the broader claim for a
strong role for the national government (Congress, the Presidency, and the federal
courts) in matters otherwise subject to regulation by state governments. Cf Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding Congress's Com-
merce Clause power to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that prevented private indi-
viduals from discriminating on the basis of race in the provision of public
accommodations); NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (uphold-
ing Congress's Commerce Clause power to enact the National Labor Relations Act
and delegate responsibility for the Act's enforcement to the NLRB).
6 This camp is consistent with, and often a part of, the broader claim for the
preservation of the sovereignty, prerogatives, and dignity of the various branches of
the state government (the state courts, the legislature, and the governor) in matters
arguably subject to regulation by the national government. Cf Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot compel state executive to perform
functions mandated by federal legislation); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995) (holding that Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded Congress's Com-
merce Clause authority); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding
that Congress cannot seek to compel states to enact legislation concerning disposal of
hazardous waste); Erie R.R- Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that federal
courts must apply state substantive law in all diversity cases).
7 For some of the cases and doctrines, see Fallon, supra note 4, at 1164-1224.
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with legal fact cannot constitute an adequate description of the field
of "Federal Courts."
As many law-and-economic scholars have contended, the process
of adequate theoretical description can be an essential first step in the
process of understanding law.8 Like these scholars, I begin with an
orientation toward description-description that can account for such
seemingly irreconcilable decisions as Alden, Seminole Tribe, and Union
Gas.9 Obviously, standard nationalist and federalist accounts cannot
do this; their internal structures require that they pronounce one or
more of these decisions "wrong."
The only adequate descriptive theory of which I am aware is a
dialogic one. This theory contends, perhaps counterintuitively, that
the fundamental constitutional role of each court system is to engage
the other system in a dialogue about the extent and shape of the
other system's rights, obligations, and entitlements. 10 Thus, state
courts must be constitutionally guaranteed the opportunity to engage
in a discussion about the scope of federal rights, and the federal courts
must comparably be given the right to engage in a discussion about
state rights. Of course, this notion of a sustained dialogue across the
state-federal divide has a number of important limitations. Most of
them lie beyond the boundaries of this present Essay. Nonetheless,
one limitation that is germane to the Alden problem is the following: A
court (whether state or federal) need not participate in each and
every case raising a right (whether federal or state) created by the
other system; it is enough that the court has the opportunity to com-
ment over a range of cases on the nature and extent of the right.
Applied to Alden, the state courts generally have the opportunity
to participate in a dialogue with the federal system on the scope and
shape of the Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the statute at issue
in Alden." Application of the FLSA to the State of Maine raised no
8 For some law-and-economics efforts that claim to be descriptive rather than
normative, see, WniAM A. LANEs & RicHAR A. POSNER, THE EcONOMIc STRucruRE
OF TORT LAW 19-24 (1987), RicHARD A. PosNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 2.2
(4th ed. 1992), and Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 YALE
L.J. 799 (1983). This effort to understand "law as it is" grows out of one of the many
branches of legal realism. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Func-
tional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809, 824 (1935); Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in A
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 261 (Dennis Patterson ed.,
1996).
9 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
10 For simplicity's sake, I will refer to the full package of rights, obligations, end-
dements, and interests with which a court might concern itself as "rights."
11 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-94 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
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peculiar issues not presented by cases involving private employers in
Maine; hence, as long as Maine courts could engage in a dialogue
about the scope and extent of the FLSA in other cases, there was no
constitutional reason to require that Maine state courts be held open to
discuss the scope and extent of the FLSA in cases involving the State
of Maine as an employer. Whether to allow Maine state courts to do so
was essentially a matter of prudential judgment, on which reasonable
minds can differ. My own judgment is that the majority made a wrong
call on this prudential decision, but it made a permissible constitu-
tional choice.
This argument hinges on three propositions: (1) the value of en-
gaging in descriptive theoretical work, (2) the exposition and descrip-
tive accuracy of a dialogic theory, and (3) the successful application of
the theory to Alden. Each of the three propositions deserves a better
development and defense than I can provide within the limitations of
this Essay. I hope to return to the task soon. For now, let me sketch
the main lines of the argument.
I. THE OBLIGATION OF ADEQUATE DESCR=PTION
No legal system in history has produced a scholarship with the
richness, breadth, and depth of the American system. For the most
part, the "best" scholarship in our system is analytical, self-referent,
and normative: it develops practical legal consequences (the
"oughts") from unprovable yet uncontestable first principles. The
great values of this scholarship are its holding forth of certain ideals-
the ideals represented by the uncontestable first premises-and its
spinning out of a coherent legal system developed from these ideals.
The great deficiency of this scholarship is its inability to account for
"wrong" decisions-decisions that violate the coherence of the system
or deviate irreconcilably from first principles.1 2 Within normative
scholarship, there are three moves available to address "wrong" deci-
sions: treat the decision as wrong and maintain the consistency of the
original system, find a way to explain the result from within the logic
and language of the original system, or abandon the system.' 3
My own intellectual predilictions make me skeptical of normative
theory, at least when it seeks to maintain a system in the face of the
contrary evidence of the real world. No theory that conflicts with the
facts of the real world-here, the facts of actual legal decisions-is
12 By "decisions" I mean not only decisions of courts, but also decisions of other
entities charged with establishing legal rules.
13 A fourth choice-to adjust the system to account for the new decision-is a
special case of abandoning the original system.
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adequate. 14 And as useful as inadequate theories can be as a spur to
imagination and insight, there remains the fatal objection: they are
not "true," in the sense that they do not correspond to the actual legal
world.
Lost in the normativity of most legal scholarship is the value of
adequate theoretical description. Descriptive scholarship seeks, obvi-
ously, to describe the actual state of legal rules (the "is"). Description
alone, however, is uninteresting; Alden could be described as a
"United State Supreme Court decision," or as a "decision on the scope
of Article I and the Eleventh Amendment," or even as a "decision of
a court filed on June 23, 1999." None of these descriptions provides
any framework for deeper understanding of legally relevant catego-
ries. Description must therefore be joined with theory. A description
must be a powerful source of ideas. Descriptive scholarship must ad-
umbrate consequences of importance for the understanding and de-
velopment of legal rules; it must, in other words, have normative
aspirations. None of the descriptions developed above adds much to
our understanding of Alden, or anything to the development of legal
rules (the "ought").
Obviously, a description that is inaccurate is of little aid to under-
standing or development.15 Indeed, unlike normative scholarship,
which is first concerned with the "ought," descriptive scholarship,
which is first concerned with the "is," necessarily collapses when it fails
adequately to capture and explain legal decisions that fairly lie within
the compass of the theory. Thus, any adequate theoretical description
is subject to change as new legal decisions are generated. Sooner or
later, some actual legal decision will seem to conflict with the theory.
At that point, only two moves are available to the descriptive scholar:
explain the decision within the logic and language of the descriptive
account, or abandon the system.' 6 The move of declaring the new
legal decision "wrong" and maintaining the correctness of the old par-
adigm is not available.
Adequate theoretical description is a difficult task, not as often
attempted in law as in other disciplines, such as the sciences, with
14 See ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REAITY 3 (David Ray Griffin &
Donald W. Sherbum eds., 1978).
15 It is useful to the extent that it serves as a source of ideas about legal decisions,
just as normative scholarship does.
16 Abandonment includes the possibility of revising or broadening the descrip-
tion in a way that now makes it adequate. See supra note 13. Of course, care must be
taken not to so broaden the description to the point that the description loses any
normative or predictive value.
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stronger traditions of accounting for physical data. 17 The method re-
quires only two things: an aptitude for simplification and a willingness
to stand apart from the usual normative debates in search of a metas-
tructure within which the normative debates can not only be toler-
ated, but also flourish.
The standard strands in "Federal Courts" scholarship-national-
ism and federalism-are normative theories, both in the sense that
they proceed from first principles of constitutional structure and in
the sense that, sooner or later, some case or doctrine can be found to
contradict the theory. My guess is that, for virtually all those inclined
to nationalist outlooks and even for many inclined to federalist out-
looks, Alden cannot be explained from within the confines of the the-
ory that they have developed. An available move, especially for those
whose theories are most profoundly shaken by Alden, is therefore to
pronounce the case "wrong." Those of a strong federalist bent might
find vindication in Alden, though these strong theories cannot ade-
quately explain other decisions-perhaps including Ex Parte Young,18
Monroe v. Pape,'9 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,20 Brown v. Allen,21 Fay v. Noia,22
General Oil Co. v. Crain,23 or Tarble's Cas 24-that suggest a broader
role for federal courts and federal law in relation to the states.
My interest, as you might gather, is in attempting to craft an ade-
quate theoretical description of "Federal Courts."25 Therefore,
17 Cf Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MIcH. L. REv. 1463, 1463
(1987) ("Law professors need not be lexicographers in putting together materials for
course study, although providing definition to an area of law represents perhaps the
highest form of that enterprise as scholarship."); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial
Review, 91 Mici. L. REv. 577 (1993) (attempting a descriptive dialogic theory ofjudi-
cial review).
18 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
19 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
20 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
21 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
22 372 U.S. 391 (1963). Fay, of course, was first limited and then largely overruled
by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), and Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722
(1991). Cf 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (2) (Supp. III 1998) (describing circumstances under
which an evidentiary hearing should be held when a petitioner fails to develop the
record in his or her state criminal trial). The fact that Fay was overrruled may blunt
the force of the federalist critique, but one cannot avoid the fact that Fay must still be
accounted for in any description of the permissible reach of "Federal Courts."
23 209 U.S. 211 (1908).
24 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872).
25 In this Essay, I will assume that "Federal Courts" is a definable package of legal
decisions that is an appropriate subject of adequate theoretical description. How
such packages are determined is, in and of itself, a difficult question facing the de-
scriptive effort.
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although my own sympathies lie unapologetically in the nationalist di-
rection, I do not have the luxury of declaring Alden wrong. Any theo-
retical description of "Federal Courts" must adequately account for
Alden or else be abandoned. The dialogic theory provides an ade-
quate account.
II. DIALOGUE AND SomE OF ITS ImvITS
I am not the first to propose a dialogic understanding of the rela-
tionship between state and federal courts and between the federal
courts and other branches of state and federal government. Robert
Cover has argued that the fostering of dialogue justifies the federal
courts' diversity jurisdiction, 26 Martin Redish has argued that the rela-
tionship between the state and federal courts is best understood as
"interactive,"27 and Barry Friedman has argued that federal courts
should and do engage in a dialogue with Congress over the proper
scope of federal rights.2 8 The theories of Cover and Redish contend
that the use of one court system to decide cases arising under the law
of another system advances important values, 29 while Friedman's the-
ory focuses on the value of dialogue among the various branches of
the national government. In this regard, my dialogic theory follows
the theories of Cover and Redish, and expands upon them.
The fundamental point of the dialogic theory is that an essential
constitutional function of federal courts is to engage state courts in a
dialogue regarding the scope of state-created rights, while an essential
constitutional function of state courts is to engage federal courts in a
26 See Robert M. Cover, The Uses ofJurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and
Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 639 (1981); cf Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Cour4 86 YALE. L.J. 1035, 1036
(1977) (arguing that, in habeas cases, the Warren Court "chose redundancy and indi-
rection as its remedial strategy" and suggesting that "[tihis strategy structured a dia-
logue on the future of constitutional requirements in criminal law in which state and
federal courts were required both to speak and to listen as equals").
27 Martin H. Redish, Supreme Court Review of State Court "Federal"Decisions: A Study
in Interactive Federalism, 19 GA. L. REv. 861 (1985).
28 See Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal
Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1990); cf. Friedman, supra note 17 (developing a
dialogic theory ofjudicial review).
29 Cover identifies these values as "interest" (the ability of an alternate system to
avoid self-interested judicial behavior in the first forum), "ideology" (the ability of
another system to challenge, or conversely to affirm, the established ethos or ideology
of the first system's social order), and "innovation" (the ability of another system to
help provide a fresh set of ideas for the legal rules of a system). See Cover, supra note
26, at 658-80.
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dialogue about the scope of federally created rights. 0 This intuition is
one with which neither nationalists nor federalist can accede. Nation-
alists-who typically regard the creation and protection of federal
rights as the raison d'etre of federal courts3 1-might accept the notion
that federal courts should determine questions of state law, but would
be unwilling to give state courts this central a role with regard to fed-
eral rights. Conversely, federalists-who typically regard state courts
as perfectly adequate protectors of federal rights but are suspicious of
federal involvement in matters of state law 32 -might be willing to em-
brace state courts' engagement with federal law, but would be unwill-
ing to concede so central a role to the federal courts in the exposition
of state law. The dialogic theory mediates between the two standard
attitudes in "Federal Courts" scholarship, though not in a fashion that
either side might find helpful. 33
A dialogic theory has necessary limits that fall, loosely, into three
categories. The first set of limits concerns the needs associated with
any well-functioning adjudicatory system. For instance, predictability
and certainty impose ultimate limits on dialogue, and require an ulti-
mate decisionmaker on matters of both state and federal law. Not
unreasonably (though not necessarily), the ultimate arbiter of federal
30 Also implicit in the nature of dialogue, of course, is the ability of each court
system to address itself to the exposition and development of rights arising from
within its own system; thus, federal courts must have opportunity to discuss questions
of federal rights, and state courts must have the opportunity to discuss questions of
state rights.
31 Cf Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816) (arguing
for Supreme Court review of state decisions construing federal law because "[t]he
constitution has presumed (whether rightly or wrongly we do not inquire) that state
attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests, might sometimes
obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct or control, the regular administration
of justice" and because of "the importance, and even necessity of uniformiy of deci-
sions throughout the whole United States").
32 Cf Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.35 (1976) ("Despite differences in insti-
tutional environment and the unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims
of some state judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that there now exists a
general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate
courts of the several States.").
33 Cf DAVID L. SHAPIO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 108 (1995) (underscoring "the
strength of federalism as itselfa dialogue about government" and arguing that neither
nationalist nor federalist views are "rhetorically or normatively complete without the
other"); Fallon, supra note 4, at 1224-51 (arguing that "Federal Courts"jurisprudence
should attempt to mediate between the nationalist and federalist poles).
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matters would be the United States Supreme Court,3 4 and the ulti-
mate arbiter of state matters would be a state's court of last resort.3 5
A second set of constraints on the theory is essentially efficiency-
based. For instance, in order to obtain the benefits of intersystem dia-
logue, it is not necessary that such dialogue occur in each and every
case. Certain barriers that operate in a way not systematically discrimi-
natory to the ultimate obligation of dialogue in a particular category
of right can be raised. It is, for instance, an entirely defensible
(though not constitutionally compelled) position to raise barriers that
make state courts the primary expositors of state rights and federal
courts the primary expositors of federal rights. Indeed, in order that
true intersystem dialogue can occur, it is essential that certain barriers
be established; otherwise, hypothetically, federal courts could end up
deciding all questions of state law or state courts all questions of fed-
eral law.36 Thus, neutral barriers such as complete diversity37 or a
minimum amount in controversy38 should be anticipated.
A third set of limits derives from constitutional concerns such as
separation of powers and federalism. As with the last type of limita-
tion, this limitation must generally operate in a way that does not sys-
tematically discriminate against the obligation of dialogue with regard
to certain categories of right. For instance, in certain areas Congress
might regard the uniform exposition of federal law to be so critical
that it removes the possibility of dialogue. Thus, the development of
certain federal rights might be exclusively entrusted to the jurisdiction
34 See Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 348.
35 See Erie R.t Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1935); Murdock v. City of Mem-
phis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). The problem of interwoven state and federal
rights presents a difficult problem beyond the scope of the present Essay. Cf Ward v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17, 22 (1920) (holding that when state and fed-
eral rights are interwoven and the state law ground of decision obviates the need to
decide the federal question, the Supreme Court can examine a state court's determi-
nation of the state law ground to ensure that it has "fair or substantial support").
36 This last statement assumes that, pursuant to its Article III, Section 1 powers to
"ordain and establish" lower federal courts and its Article III, Section 2 powers to
create "exceptions and regulations" to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction,
Congress could remove all federal jurisdiction over claims invoking federal rights. See
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. Whether Congress enjoys such
power is unclear. See Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869); RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WEcHsLE'S THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
370-73 (4th ed. 1996).
37 See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
38 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (establishing a "more than
$75,000" amount in controversy requirement in diversity cases).
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of federal courts or adjudicatory agencies.3 9 Similarly, federalist con-
cerns for the uniformity of state law in certain critical areas might lead
to the exclusive entrustment of certain state or federal claims to state
courts or adjudicatory agencies.40 Such exclusive arrangements
should be narrowly construed, 41 especially when concerns for federal-
ism rather than separation of powers are at stake.42
I am unable within the confines of this short Essay to develop the
political and theoretical arguments for the superiority of a dialogic
theory, or to defend it against criticisms that it is historically, politi-
cally, or theoretically inferior.43 But such arguments are, to some ex-
tent, beside the point. The main issue for me, at least at the present
time, is that the theory adequately describes the subject of "Federal
Courts." This Section of the Essay was designed to do no more than
suggest that a dialogic theory might in fact constitute an adequate ex-
planation of the broad array of the issues of concern to "Federal
Courts." The theory cannot be adequate, however, unless it can ex-
plain Alden. To that task I now turn.
III. EXPLAINING ALDEN
A. The Basic Account
Alden held that Congress could not require that state courts be
held open to claims that a state has violated the Fair Labor Standards
Act. The FLSA is a statute of general applicability; private employers
39 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333, 1334, 1338 (1994) (providing exclusive federal ju-
risdiction in admiralty, bankruptcy, and patent cases); General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore
& Mich. S. R.R. Co., 260 U.S. 261 (1922) (holding that federal jurisdiction in Sher-
man Act and Clayton Act civil antitrust actions is exclusive).
40 See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (requiring federal abstention
in cases raising issues within purview of specialized state adjudicatory structure). Of
course, in cases in which Burford abstention is invoked, the Supreme Court remains
available to hear, within its usual rules for review of state court judgments, any claims
that the state court improperly decided the question of federal right.
41 See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990) (describing presumption of concur-
rent state and federal jurisdiction); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New
Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989) (tightening scope of Burford abstention).
42 This last proposition deserves greater defense than I can give it here.
43 On the question of the historical validity of such a theory, see Redish, supra
note 27, at 882-88. For an ever-so-brief argument on the political and theoretical
superiority of the theory, see infra text accompanying note 78. For criticisms of other
dialogic theories, see Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of
Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1306-14 (1999) (critiquing dialogic understanding
ofjudicial review in rulemaking context), and Michael Wells, Congress's Paramount Role
in Setting the Scope of FederalJurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 465 (1991) (critiquing dia-
logic understanding of federal courts' role in establishing federal jurisdiction).
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as well as states are subject to its terms.44 Since the FLSA was a statute
enacted pursuant to Congress's Commerce Clause powers, the hold-
ing of Alden can be generalized as follows: Congress cannot abrogate a
state's immunity from suit in its own courts when it legislates pursuant
to its Article I powers. Taken together with the Court's prior decision
in Seminole Tribe, which held that Congress cannot abrogate a state's
immunity from suit in federal court when it legislates pursuant to the
Indian Commerce Clause (or, by reasonable extension, pursuant to
any of its other Article I powers),45 Alden effectively makes a state im-
mune from suit in any court for claims for damages that are premised
on rights created by Congress under Article I. Both Alden and Seminole
Tribe made clear, however, that Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer 46 which held that
Congress could abrogate a state's sovereign immunity from suit in fed-
eral court when it enacted legislation pursuant to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, remained good law.47 The net effect of
these three cases (Seminole Tribe, Alden, and Fitzpatrick) is to preclude
congressional abrogation of a state's immunity for damages actions in
any court (state or federal) when it legislates pursuant to its Article I
44 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), 216(b) (1994). Although Alden addresses the issue in
only cursory form, see Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999) (noting that Al-
den's lawsuit "calls into question the constitutionality of the provisions of the FISA
purporting to authorize private actions against States in their own courts without regard
for consent") (emphasis added), 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(b), 203(d), 203(e), 203(x), and
216(b) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) appear to evince a sufficiently clear congressional
statement to subject states to suit for violations of the FLSA. Given the richness of the
.unmistakably clear statement" analysis in other cases, see, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Flor-
ida, 517 U.S. 44, 55-57 (1996); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7-13
(1989); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985), the absence of that
analysis in Alden is surprising.
45 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 62 (noting that the Indian Commerce Clause
"accomplishes a greater transfer of power from the States to the Federal Government
than does the Interstate Commerce Clause"); id. at 73 ("Article I cannot be used to
circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.").
46 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
47 See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267; Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59; see also College Say.
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2224
(1999). The Court has never held whether Section 5 of the 14th Amendment permits
Congress to abrogate the state's immunity from suit in its own courts. Cf Howlett v.
Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) (requiring state courts to entertain actions against local
school board under § 1983, which was passed pursuant to Section 5, when state courts
were open to similar § 1983 and state-law claims); General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S.
211 (1908) (requiring state courts to entertain injunctive suits against state officials
that violate federal rights). On the scope of Congress's power under Section 5, see
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000), Rorida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999), and City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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powers, but to permit abrogation in (at least) federal court when Con-
gress legislates pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Seminole Tribe was a horrible blow to nationalists who view the es-
sential function of lower federal courts to be the protection of federal
rights. Alden rubbed salt in the wound, for it removed even the back-
stop of state courts (whose decision on federal law could have ulti-
mately been reviewed by the Supreme Court). 48 Alden's removal of
the backstop also poses a problem for those federalists who have con-
tended that, in the absence of federal court enforcement of federal
rights, state courts were constitutionally compelled to enforce these
rights. 49
The inability of these theories to explain the outcome in Alden
poses insurmountable difficulties for their adequacy. The dialogic
theory faces no comparable difficulty. Since the FLSA is a federal
right, the dialogic theory posits that state courts should be able to
participate in a dialogue with federal courts about the shape of the
FLSA. Alden does not deprive state courts of that essential obligation.
State courts are still able-and here is the critical point-to engage in
a dialogue with the federal courts about the FLSA, since state courts
are still open to FLSA cases involving private employers. State courts
just may not adjudicate FLSA cases involving an unconsenting state as
an employer. Unless FLSA cases against states present a unique con-
textual setting or unique interpretative questions that cannot be
presented in cases involving private employers-and there are no in-
dications in Alden that this was true-there is no constitutional reason
to require that state courts entertain FLSA actions against the states.
This last conclusion has two limitations, one implicit and one ex-
plicit. The implicit limitation is that the Court has a principled reason
to exclude state courts from adjudicating state-as-employer FLSA
claims. I have posited three such categories of neutral principled rea-
sons: reasons inhering in the nature of adjudication, efficiency rea-
sons, and reasons that advance or are consistent with the
constitutional structure. 50 Alden does not fit within the first category,
and it appears not to fit within the second. 51 It does, however, fit
48 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1994); Cohens v.Virginia, 19 U.S. (6Wheat.) 264 (1821).
49 See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1401 (1953) ("In the scheme of
the Constitution, [state courts] are the primary guarantors of constitutional rights,
and in many cases they may be the ultimate ones.").
50 See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
51 It is evident that Alden is not compelled by such adjudicative norms as accuracy,
certainty, or finality. Since the combined effect of Seminole Tribe and Alden appears to
be the elimination of all FLSA cases against states, Alden also cannot be easily ex-
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within the third. Concerns for proper state-federal relations permeate
the Constitution and the cases interpreting it. The Court could (not
must, or even should, but could) legitimately believe that this relational
concern was given best effect by excluding state-as-employer FLSA
cases from the ambit of the state-federal dialogue about the nature
and interpretation of the FLSA. Of course, the Court could also have
found that the relational concerns were not sufficiently strong to jus-
tify the exclusion of these claims. The arguments about how this ques-
tion should have been answered-properly understood as arguments
of policy, comity, and restraint rather than as arguments of constitu-
tional compulsion 52-are developed in Alden's majority and dissenting
opinions. Seen in this light, the outcome in Alden rests on a pruden-
tial judgment of state-federal relations, not on an absolute constitu-
tional command.
A second, express limitation on my account of Alden is that a
state-as-employer FLSA claim presents no unique interpretive con-
texts-in other words, the federal right was not intended to apply dif-
ferently to states than to private citizens. Federal rights that apply to
states as states (rather than to states as participants in conduct also
undertaken by private persons) are different. Here the requisite dia-
logue concerning the scope of federal rights is impossible unless the
states (or at least their officials or instrumentalities) are subject to suit.
An immunity of a state from damages actions in state and federal
court could no longer be constitutionally maintained.
The dialogic theory is therefore consistent with-albeit on terms
different than the Court's mindless historical assertion that the Four-
teenth Amendment came later than the Eleventh Amendment, which
came later than Article I-53-the Court's simultaneous unwillinguess to
provide Congress with abrogation powers under Article I while pre-
serving Congress's abrogation powers in Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the result in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer. The Fourteenth
Amendment serves as the conduit through which most constitutional
plained on grounds of an efficient allocation of scarce federal resources. The effi-
ciency argument does not usually reach so far as to allow the outright elimination,
rather than the partial reallocation, of entire categories of claims from federal or state
court jurisdiction.
52 As noted earlier, a dialogic theory can explain the outcome in Alden but not
the reasoning, which framed the issue in constitutional terms. See supra note 2 and
accompanying text. Cf David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the
Pennhurst Case, 98 HAuv. L. Rxv. 61, 62 (1984) (suggesting that "flexible doctrines of
construction, comity, and constraint" could do the work of the present l1th Amend-
ment analysis).
53 SeeAlden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2267 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 59 (1996).
20001 1173
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
obligations are brought home against states acting in a governmental
capacity.54 Since the discussion and development of these govern-
mental obligations is, by hypothesis, a central function of federal and
state courts, and since these obligations have no precise analog in the
obligations of private citizens, the dialogic theory suggests that there
must be avenues created through which the necessary discussion and
development of these obligations can occur.
The possible avenues are many, and include allowing the individ-
uals aggrieved by the state's violation of its obligation to assert the
violation as a defense against state action taken against the individ-
ual,55 the judicial creation of direct remedies for violation, 56 and legis-
lation enacted pursuant to Section 5 to vindicate the individual's
right.57 As long as adequate discussion and development of the right
is possible, no particular avenue is necessarily required-though con-
gressional action to establish a particular remedial scheme should be,
in accordance with usual principles of constitutional democracy, given
appropriate deference by the judicial branch. Hence, the outcome in
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, which upholds § 1983 against a challenge that it
violates the Eleventh Amendment, is correct-and may indeed be
(from within the dialogic theory) the only case in recent Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence that is constitutionally compelled.58
Conversely, however, when Congress enacts legislation pursuant
to Article I, it does not impose obligations against states in their gov-
ernmental capacity; rather, the obligations are ones that can be (and
are) imposed on private citizens as well. There is no reason inherent
54 There are others. For instance, the Supremacy Clause imposes certain obliga-
tions on state courts. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also infra notes 59, 64 and
accompanying text. Other post-ilth Amendment delegations of authority to Con-
gress to "enforce" the constitutional provisions at stake include Section 2 of the 13th
Amendment, Section 2 of the 15th Amendment, Section 2 of the 19th Amendment,
Section 2 of the 23rd Amendment, and Section 2 of the 26th Amendment. Presuma-
bly, on the Court's present historical analysis, Congress could also abrogate the immu-
nity of states when it properly enacts legislation pursuant to one of these powers.
55 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
56 Cf Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (creating di-
rect damages remedy against federal officials for violation of Fourth Amendment); Ex
ParteYoung, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (creating direct injunctive remedy against state offi-
cials for violation of 14th Amendment).
57 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. I will not debate the scope of Section
5 here, except to say that Section 5 must be understood against a dialogic
background.
58 I hedge a bit in making this claim because I do not mean to suggest that § 1983
is itself constitutionally compelled; in the absence of § 1983, other constitutionally
adequate avenues for discussion of the relevant federal rights might still exist.
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to the dialogic process that such obligations must be enforced against
the states in the courts.
Moreover, the dialogic theory rather easily leaps an adequacy
hurdle that more traditional nationalist and federalist theories find
more challenging: the reconciliation of Testa v. Katt,5 9 Reich v. Col-
lins,60 and Alden. Testa (read broadly) held that state courts cannot
refuse to hear federal claims over which Congress has given them ju-
risdiction; Reich (read broadly) held that state courts are constitution-
ally required to hold themselves open to provide a repayment remedy
for taxpayers who pay a state tax that violates federal law (which may
have as its source an Article I enactment);61 and Alden held that state
courts cannot be compelled to hold themselves open to monetary
claims premised on violations by states of federal laws enacted pursu-
ant to Article I. Alden plausibly distinguished Testa by noting that Testa
involved a case against a private citizen and not a state, so that nothing
in Testa requires that state courts be held open to federal claims
against states. 62 Fair enough. But the reconciliation of the Reich line
of cases with Alden seems far more problematic for nearly everyone:
nationalists that view Reich as standing for a broad principle of the
supremacy of federal rights, federalists that view state courts as the
ultimate backstop for the enforcement of federal rights, and federal-
ists that believe that states retain an absolute immunity from suit.
A dialogic theory finds these cases more easily reconcilable. To
begin with the harder Reich-Alden "conflict," the critical point is that
taxation is a function that involves the state qua state; unlike the obli-
59 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
60 513 U.S. 106 (1994).
61 In Reich, the claim was that the state tax scheme violated the statutorily codified
intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine. See Reich, 513 U.S. at 108; Davis v. Michi-
gan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 813 (1989) (recognizing the doctrine has an
underlying constitutional basis). In Ward, another case seemingly requiring a state
court remedy to recoup state taxes paid in violation of the laws and Constitution of
the United States, the underlying source of the right not to be taxed was a treaty
ratified by Congress pursuant to Article I. See Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253
U.S. 17, 19 (1920); see also McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & To-
bacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires meaningful
opportunity to secure postpayment relief when State denied prepayment relief, tax is
collected in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, and State had waived immu-
nity from suit in state court for refund actions, suggesting that a state could in the
alternative avoid allegations of discrimination by collecting the tax from taxpayers'
competitors).
62 SeeAlden 119 S. CL at 2240, 2261, 2265. I am merely repeating the distinction
suggested (though never fully articulated) by the Court. See id. at 2259-60 (distin-
guishing Howlett, a decision in the Testa line, on similar grounds). Whether the spirit
of Testa supports this distinction is another matter.
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gations at stake in Alden, the nature and scope of the federal limita-
tions on a state's taxing scheme cannot be adequately developed
through litigation between private citizens. Hence, the only way in
which the state and federal courts can engage in a dialogue about the
scope of the federal right allegedly violated by the state's taxing
scheme is for state courts to hear, on a prepayment or postpayment
basis, the claims of taxpayers against the state. 63 The same was not
true of FLSA claims, in which the dialogue can continue in private
employer suits.
Accounting for the "conflict" between Testa and Alden is also not
difficult, though the explanation differs from the Court's. The critical
point is the dialogic preference for state court involvement in the
shaping of the scope of federal legislation. State courts cannot de-
cline their constitutional obligation to assist in the process of shaping
federal rights, except in the three situations discussed earlier.64 As in
Alden, neither the adjudicatory nor the efficiency exception pertained
in Testa. As in Alden, the third exception-structural concerns of sep-
aration of powers and federalism-did pertain. Unlike Alden, how-
ever, the acceptance of the state's argument in Testa would have
meant that state courts could have shirked entirely their constitutional
obligation to participate in the shaping of the scope of federal legisla-
tion; since the structural exception cannot swallow the constitutional
obligation of intersystem dialogue, Testa was clearly correct. In Alden,
on the other hand, acceptance of the state's argument still left open
state court adjudication of FLSA rights in cases involving private em-
ployers. Thus, Alden was within the bounds of its permissible judg-
ment to hold as it did.
B. Three Drawbacks
This dialogic account of Alden has three drawbacks, one largely
hypothetical and two quite pressing and real. The hypothetical draw-
back is this: Suppose that Congress, pursuant to its Article I powers,
were to have enacted the FLSA only against the states; in other words,
the FLSA did not apply to private employers. In this situation, the
objection would run, state and federal courts could engage in a dia-
63 But for the operation of the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994), fed-
eral courts could also hear such claims. The federal end of the dialogic bargain can,
however, be upheld by Supreme Court review of the final decisions of a state's court
of last resort.
64 See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text. The "valid excuse" doctrine,
which permits state courts to refuse to entertain federal causes of action when there
exists a non-discriminatory and valid reason for not doing so, see Howlett v. Rose, 496
U.S. 356, 369-75 (1990), easily fits within the three exceptions of the dialogic theory.
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logue about the scope of the FLSA only in lawsuits against the states.
Nothing in Alden suggests that such lawsuits would be countenanced.
Hence, the dialogic theory stumbles.
My response to this objection is threefold. First, I think the objec-
tion is highly speculative. Congress is unlikely to pass such legislation,
nor is the Court's response to such a hypothetical statute, which is far
different than the FLSA, entirely clear. Second, even if the Court
would not uphold the statute insofar as state employees could sue,
other mechanisms through which such dialogue might occur-for in-
stance, suits by the United States against the offending state and in-
junctive suits or damages actions against state officials-would still
exist.6 5 Finally, on the assumption that Congress refused to provide
such mechanisms, that the Court refused to imply them, and that the
hypothetical statute were constitutional, then the dialogic theory as
presently described would indeed encounter a fatal descriptive road-
block. Such is the ultimate fate of all descriptive theories. 66 But I am
not quite ready to write the theory's obituary because of this hypothet-
ical statute. It strikes me that such a statute, which puts states at a
disadvantage as an employer in relation to private industry, would
likely be unconstitutional; Congress cannot discriminate against states
by creating federal rights that (a) do not affect the state qua state and
(b) apply to the states but not to private participants engaged in simi-
lar conduct. One (though not the only) way to block the enforce-
ment of such a statute is to permit a state to retain its immunity from
suit against discriminatory legislation. This much of Seminole Tribe and
Alden-a far narrower constitutional slice than these cases suggest-
may therefore be constitutionally compelled.
A second, more pressing drawback is the "no right without a rem-
edy" objection. The effect of Seminole Tribe and Alden is, of course, to
deny the most effective remedy (money) to victims of a state's past
violations of federal rights. The forward-looking Ex parte Young rem-
edy is a scant remedym-indeed, no remedy at all-in cases in which
the unlawful conduct or harmful consequences are no longer ongo-
65 The Court made clear in dicta in Seminole Tribe and Alden that these other
methods of enforcement of obligations against states are not subject to the 11th
Amendment. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14 (1996); i&L at 73
n.16; Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267-68; cf. United States v. Vermont Natural Resources, 162
F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 2391 (1999) (raising issue whether qui
tam actions brought against states on behalf of the United States by private parties
violate the 11th Amendment).
66 See ALFRED NORTH WHiTEHEAD, ADWNvxwRus OF IDEAS 203 (1933) ("Each
method of limited understanding is at length exhausted."); see also supra note 16 and
accompanying text.
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ing; and the increasing instability of the Ex parte Young injunction67
makes it a less than certain remedy even when the violation is ongo-
ing. The remedy of enforcement by the federal government is as un-
certain as the political pressures placed on, and the workload of,
government lawyers. 68 Damages actions against individual state viola-
tors are meaningless if the violators are insolvent, and may not be
available in certain cases involving violations of federal statute.69 Even
if the principle is not implicit in the very nature of adjudication, 70 the
"no right without a remedy" principle is ingrained in the American
notion of adjudication.71 Surely no theory, dialogic or otherwise, that
tolerates such a breach of a fundamental principle can be tolerated.
I have great sympathy for this criticism; indeed, it is one of the
reasons that I would have preferred a different outcome in Seminole
Tribe and Alden. But I do not regard it as fatal, for three reasons. First,
as a statement of fundamental American law, the "no right without a
remedy" principle has never been absolute. 72 Second, and relatedly,
67 See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S.
at 73-76.
68 The United States is authorized-but not required-to file suit against any
employer that violates the FLSA. Any recovery in such a suit is to be held in a special
deposit account and paid, upon order of the Secretary of Labor, to the affected em-
ployees. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1994).
69 Compare Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S.
418, 423 (1987) (requiring "express provision or other specific evidence from the
statute itself that Congress intended to foreclose" a § 1983 remedy), with Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n., 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981) (deny-
ing § 1983 remedy when allegedly violated federal statute provides other "quite com-
prehensive enforcement mechanisms" and "so many statutory remedies"), and Maine
v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (providing damages action under § 1983 against state
officials who illegally denied benefits under the Social Security Act).
70 SeeJay Tidmarsh, UnattainableJustice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits
ofJudicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1736-40 (1992).
71 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
72 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1731, 1778 (1991) ("Marbury's apparent
promise of effective redress for all constitutional violations reflects a principle, not an
ironclad rule, and its ideal is not always attained."); see also Barry Friedman, W'hen
Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735 (1992).
If Marbury's fundamental tenet were correct, we would expect to find a tight
congruence in constitutional law between right and remedy. What emerges
from a study of the law of remedy and enforcement, however, is the picture
of a system in which there is tremendous flexibility in the fit between right
and remedy and therefore a system in which rights receive far less respect
than the rhetoric would suggest.
Id. at 738; see also John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109
YALE L.J. 87 (1999) (stating that present law essentially requires a finding of fault
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the various remedies that I have already listed-Ex parte Young injunc-
tions, federal enforcement, and damages suits against responsible
state officials-are significant, even if not equally effective; the Mar-
bury "no right without a remedy" principle has never been understood
to require that the most effective remedy is constitutionally com-
pelled. Third, the problem with the "no right without a remedy" prin-
ciple-to the extent that Alden irreconcilably conflicts with it-lies
with the principle and not with Alden. Recall that the project that
animates this Essay is the development of an adequate theoretical de-
scription of the law of "Federal Courts." If Alden conflicts with the "no
right without a remedy" principle, then that principle cannot be
viewed as a necessary component of an adequate theoretical descrip-
tion of "Federal Courts." To the extent that the dialogic theory can
encompass, but not insist on, a strong "no right without a remedy"
principle, its adequacy passes over yet another hurdle.
The third drawback is perhaps the most significant. The objec-
tion runs as follows: As a general proposition, courts must enforce
legislative commands unless they are unconstitutional; put differently,
it is generally thought that a court's only legitimate justification for
failing to enforce a statute is the statute's unconstitutionality. Relat-
edily, as I suggested earlier, a court should generally defer to the meth-
ods created by Congress for the enforcement of federal rights.73
Turning these principles on Alden, Congress made the states liable in
damages actions for FLSA violations.74 After Alden and Seminole Tribe,
however, no court can entertain a damages action against an uncon-
senting state. If Seminole Tribe and Alden are not grounded in constitu-
tional bedrock, then under what authority can the Court ignore
Congress's democratically expressed will and refuse to permit suits
against states to be entertained?
My only replies to this criticism are two pleas in avoidance. First,
although it is true that courts are generally to accede to Congress's
wishes on the scope of legislation, the Court has not always done so in
the area of congressionally established remedies. 75 Indeed, the
before providing monetary remedies for constitutional violations and arguing that
this requirement has certain benefits).
73 See supra text following note 57.
74 At least it apparently did. See supra note 44.
75 See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (denying § 1983 injunc-
tive remedy against state officials); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73-76
(1996) (denying § 1983 injunctive remedy for Governor's violation of federal law,
despite clear statement from Congress that it intended to create a federal remedy);
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (denying habeas remedy to most petitioners
seeking release for violations of a "new rule," even though text of former 28 U.S.C.
11792000]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Court's record on acceding to Congress's apparent remedial intention
is sufficiently irregular that the ignoring of the FLSA remedy in Alden
is not so different in kind as it is in quality. It may be true that, in the
area of fashioning remedies, the Court has a peculiar role to play-a
role in which the will of Congress is but one factor to consider.76 Sec-
ond, and more to the point, this broader role of nullifying congressio-
§ 2254 (1994) suggested no such distinction); Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v. Na-
tional Sea Clammers Ass'n 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (denying § 1983 monetary remedy for
state official's violation of federal law, without a clear statement from Congress that it
intended to eliminate such a remedy); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (denying
habeas remedy for Fourth Amendment violations by state officials, even though text
of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) suggested no such denial); Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (denying § 1983 injunctive remedy when state criminal
prosecution is ongoing, despite lack of statutory authority to do so). Lest the list
appear too one-sided, the Court has also created remedies not clearly intended by
Congress. SeeJ.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (creating direct right of
action for violation of section 14 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 when such
an action would be a "necessary supplement" to congressionally created remedies).
Although the denial of remedies Congress has declared and the creation of additional
or supplemental remedies that Congress did not declare strike me as two different
questions, the creation of remedies further demonstrates the independence that the
Court feels in the matter of remedies.
It is also true that the Court itself has not always felt constrained by Congress's
will in the allocation of federal jurisdiction. See Friedman, supra note 28; David L.
Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985). Though this fact
provides some further indication of the independence the Court feels from congres-
sional will in matters of special importance to the judiciary, there is a categorical
difference between this type of willful ignorance and the problem in Alden, in that in
the jurisdictional cases another forum still remains open in which a claim can be
pressed.
76 Cf Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (holding that in determining whether a
private right of action should be created for violation of federal law, congressional
intent was merely one factor of four and that another factor was a federalist one-the
traditional role of states in regulating conduct). Of course, the Cort test has for the
most part fallen out of favor, and has been replaced by a test that is much closer to
the line of expressed congressional intent. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S 560 (1979). Even today, however, congressional intent is not the sole touchstone
for the creation of private rights of action. See Morse v. Republican Party, 517 U.S.
186 (1996) (finding implied right of action under section 10 of the Voting Rights
Act); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) (reaffirming private
right of action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and sec-
tion lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission's regulations enforcing sec-
tion 10(b)). In the related area of determining the scope of the lower federal courts'
statutory jurisdiction, the Court has also relied on factors other than congressional
intent. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810 (1986)
("We have consistently emphasized that, in exploring the outer reaches of § 1331,
determinations about federal jurisdiction require sensitive judgments about congres-
sional intent, judicial power, and the federal system.").
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nally mandated remedies is not precluded by the dialogic theory. The
critical question under this theory is the engagement of both state and
federal systems in the development of state and federal rights. So
long as that function is neither destroyed in its entirety nor destroyed
for impermissible reasons, there is no constitutional difficulty with re-
medial nullification; in other words, as long as the Court does not so
constrain the remedy that the development of the right is as a legal or
practical matter impossible, and as long as any limited remedial nulli-
fication can be justified on adjudicatory, efficiency, or structural
grounds,7 7 the terms of the dialogic theory have been met. As I have
suggested, Alden's remedial limitation fits within these grounds.
My project has been a descriptive, not a normative, one. As de-
scriptive accounts of the law of "Federal Courts," nationalist theories,
as well as the federalist paradigm of state courts being the ultimate
backstop in the enforcement of federal rights, have now collapsed.
Both of the latter two criticisms of my theory-the "no right without a
remedy" principle and the impropriety of avoiding Congress's will for
non-constitutional reasons-are ultimately normative arguments that
must bend before the stubborn legal fact of Alden. The time has come
to search for new, and hopefully useful, descriptive paradigms that
engage the law where it is, and where it is likely to be into the foresee-
able future.
That does not mean that I can accept Alden easily. I believe that
the Court's insufficient adherence to the "no right without a remedy"
principle makes Alden an unwise decision. Its refusal to accept the
judgment of Congress makes Alden a profoundly unwise decision-
certainly at the very edges of the Court's permissible judgment. But
not, according to the dialogic theory, beyond it.
IV. CONCLUSION
To say that the Court was within the bounds of its permissible
judgment is a faint defense of Alden. The dialogic theory, which seeks
an adequate theoretical explanation of the case, admits no more-but
also no less.
A fuller explanation and defense of the theory-including the
strongly progressive impulses that the theory generally entails-must
await another day. But it is on that progressive impulse that I should
end. Change is assured; progress is not.78 To create structures within
which change will occur, and progress will hopefully occur, is the most
77 See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
78 See ALFRED NORTH WHITEHFAD, MODES OF THOUGHT 131 (1938); WmTEBE-D,
supra note 14, at 29, 187.
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that can reasonably be accomplished by a system of government.
Sometimes in such structures progress fails, and changes in settled
understandings cause more harm than good. This may be true of Al-
den. But, at least in the long view, perhaps not. Alden might stimulate
a reinvigoration and expansion of state-created labor rights in an area
that has been subject to capture by federal law for the past sixty years.
Since the inevitable consequence of capture is that further progress is
eventually stymied, a competitive state-initiated complement to fed-
eral labor standards can be viewed as a positive development. Per-
haps, after a period of such destabilization, the federal labor standards
will find a new harmony that blends the best of the state and federal
efforts, and states will no longer be viewed as immune from these stan-
dards' reach. Alden will be overruled. The absence of immunity will
then hold until the next period of desirable destabilization.
On the other hand, such innovation in labor standards might not
occur, and states might respond to the new freedom provided in Alden
by failing either to develop complementary laws or to operate cooper-
atively with the federal government over a range of matters subject to
Congress's general Article I regulation. From a progressive perspec-
tive, this second course would not be a positive development.
Although it is too early to make any claims with certainty, I candidly
expect the second, destructive course to be the more likely-an ex-
pectation that makes me regard Alden as deeply and profoundly
unwise.
Nothing, however, can prevent the second course, or guarantee
the first. Alden will either stymie true progress or it may (at least for a
time) advance it. I would hope that the fate of Alden, which the dia-
logic theory does not regard as a constitutional constant, ultimately
hinges on which of these two possibilities comes to pass.
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